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The conventional wisdom among US foreign policy makers is that drones enable precise 
strikes, and therefore limit collateral damage. In contrast, critics point out that many 
civilian casualties have ensued, and they variously cite poor intelligence and imprecision of 
the strikes as reasons for this. Critics have also raised concerns that the US and its allies are 
Wﾐｪ;ｪｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ けﾉ;┘a;ヴWげ デﾗ ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏｷゲW ┗ｷﾗﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ ヴｷｪｴデゲ ﾉ;┘. As such, some have 
questioned whether academic engagement with the legal questions surrounding targeted 
killings amount to collusion with state attempts to legitimise human rights violations. The 
paper will argue that by conceptualising the targeted killings programme as a form of state 
terrorism, we are better equipped to provide a critical analysis of the drones programme 
within the context of a long history of violence and terrorism which has underpinned the 
imperial and neo-imperial projects of the UK and US. The paper will then argue that there 
are important similarities between the targeted killings programme, and previous UK and 
US counterinsurgency operations, including prior uses of air power, and operations 
involving the internment of terror suspects, and the targeting of specific individuals for 
interrogation and torture or disappearance. Common to these programmes is that they are 
forms of policing aimed at crushing rebellions, stifling disorder and constructing or 
maintaining particular political economies, through terror. Also common to these 
programmes are the attempts made either to conceal illicit actions, or in the event they 
are exposed, to shroud them in a veil of legitimacy. The paper concludes by offering some 
brief reflections on why we should not abandon the quest to resolve the thorny legal 
questions around the targeted killings programme. 
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Introduction 
The conventional wisdom among US foreign policy makers is that drones enable precise strikes, and 
therefore limit collateral damage. In contrast, critics of the programme point out that many civilian 
casualties have ensued, and they variously cite poor intelligence and imprecision of the strikes as 
reasons for this. It is the case that thousands of people have been killed or injured by drone strikes in 
Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Libya, many of them civilians. Academics, 
journalists and NGOs have made various attempts to either uncover aspects of the targeted killings 
programme (Cole 2012; Cobain 2013; Mayer 2009, 36-45; Whitlock 2012, 26), or to assess the impact 
on civilian populations, including by counting the number of casualties that result from drone strikes.1 
Data collected by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism Drone Wars project and the Air Wars project 
estimate that since 2004, drone strikes in Pakistan have killed 2,511 and 4,020 people, of which 
between 424 and 969 are thought to be civilians, and between 172 and 207 are children. Between 
1,161 and 1,747 have been injured.  In Yemen as a result of confirmed drone strikes since 2002, at 
least 621 people have been killed, and as many as 902, and of these, between 68 and 109 are thought 
to be civilians, between 8 and 9 of them children. The Bureau estimates that between 354 and 506 
more have been killed in unconfirmed drone strikes. In Somalia, between 251 and 427 have been killed 
in drone strikes since 2007, and of these between 3 and 12 are thought to be civilians. From 2015 
onwards in Afghanistan, between 2,902 and 3,900 people have been killed by drone strikes, and of 
these, between 153 and 220 are thought to be civilians. Between 46 and 65 are thought to be 
children.2 Airwars estimates that at least 4,887 civilians have been killed in drone strikes across Iraq, 
Syria and Libya. 3 In addition to large numbers of casualties, the targeted killings programme has had 
traumatic impacts on the communities affected.  
 
Concerns have been raised by Dawn L Rothe and Victoria E Collins (2014) that in focusing on the 
question of the legality of targeted killings, scholars are colluding in attempts to legitimise human 
rights violations. They are correct that much of the literature to date on targeted killings focuses on 
their legality and legitimacy in relation to International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law (Aslam 2011, 313-29; Benjamin 2013; Braun and Brunstetter 2013, 304-24; Brunstetter and 
Braun 2011, 337-58; Dill 2015, 51-8; Downes 2004, 277-94; Drake 2010, 629-59; Epstein 2010, 723-
44; Gregory 2011, 188-215; Gregory 2015, 197-212; Heyns and Knuckey 2013; Jaffer 2013, 185-7; 
Lewis 2011, 293-314; McDonnell 2012, 243-316; McKelvey 2011, 1353-84; Paust 2010, 569-83; 
Ramsden 2011, 385-406; Rothe and Collins 2014, 373-88; Sandvik and Lohne 2014, 145-64; Sharkey 
2010, 369-83; 2011, 229-40; Sterio 2012, 197-214; Thorp 2011; Vlasic 2011, 259-77; Whetham 2013, 
22-32).  ‘ﾗデｴW ;ﾐS Cﾗﾉﾉｷﾐゲげ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐゲ ;ヴW ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐS;HﾉWが WゲヮWIｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐ ﾉｷｪｴデ ﾗa ┘ﾗヴﾆ H┞ Cヴ;ｷｪ JﾗﾐWゲ 
(2015, 2016) on the role that lawyers increasingly play in legitimising targeted killings, through carving 
out apparently legal spaces which are intended to shield officials from litigation, especially in the case 
of Israel and the US. This concern with the use, or misuse, of law was shared by the convenors of the 
けDヴﾗﾐWゲ ;ﾐS “デ;デW TWヴヴﾗヴｷゲﾏげ ヮ;ﾐWﾉ ;デ デｴW ヲヰヱΑ I“A Cﾗﾐ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐが ┘ｴﾗ ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデed that by examining the 
targeted killings programme through the lens of state terrorism, we can get beyond the discourse of 
legality and engage more critically with the broad range of effects that military drones have on the 
victims. They stated:  
                                                          
1 The Covert Drone War programme run by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism systematically gathers data on the 
casualties of US and allied drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia:  
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/.  
The Air Wars programme tracks casualties from strikes in Iraq, Syria and Libya: https://airwars.org/. 
A study by academics has assessed the societal impacts of the drones programme in Pakistan (International Human Rights 
and Conflict Resolution Clinic and Global Justice Clinic 2012). 
2 https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/ (Figures as at 11 August 2017). 
3 https://airwars.org/ (Figures as at 11 August 2017). 
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The drone is presented as a technological innovation that transforms war into individual 
targeted strikes に ; ゲ┌ヴｪｷI;ﾉが ヮヴWIｷゲWが ;ﾐS ｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐW ┘;┞ ﾗa Sｷゲヮ;デIｴｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐWげゲ WﾐWﾏ┞く Iﾐ デｴW 
juridico-ethical discourse within which this narrative operates, the effects of drone 
bombing are strictly reduced to the relation of the drone to individual targets. The language 
of the courtroom, or of the just war theorist に problematic as it is on its own accord に thus 
becomes incapable of exploring the broad range of effects that military drones have on the 
victims. By making lethal violence the starting point through which drone warfare is to be 
subsequently analysed, there is a lack, or an intentional abolition, of a critical vocabulary 
that might render the drone intelligible as an apparatus of state terror. 
To some extent, I am sympathetic to these concerns, and agree with Jones that we should be 
IﾗﾐIWヴﾐWS ┘ｷデｴ デｴW WﾏWヴｪWﾐIW ﾗa けﾉ;┘a;ヴWげ に warfare facilitated through legal expertise, both in the 
development of doctrine and on lethal decisions during live operations. I also agree that situating the 
targeted killings programme within the wider context of state terrorism is a necessary addition to 
existing literature. The aim of this paper, though, is not simply to frame targeted killings delivered by 
drones as a form of terroristic state violence, important as that is.  
 
The paper is intended to situate the targeted killings programme within the context of historical 
colonial projects, especially British imperialism, and more recently, US neo-imperialism. In this 
respect, this paper contributes to a small but growing body of work that has begun to explore the use 
of law by powerful states involved in targeted killings to create a legal space for the exercise of state 
terrorism. This occurs through the deployment of legal expertise to legitimise both the doctrine and 
the actions of those involved in targeted killing operations, and through the carving out of 
ｪWﾗｪヴ;ヮｴｷI;ﾉ ヮﾉ;IWゲ ﾗa けW┝IWヮデｷﾗﾐげが ┘ｴWヴW デｴW ﾐﾗヴﾏ;ﾉ ヴ┌ﾉWゲ ﾗa ;ヴﾏWS IﾗﾐaﾉｷIデが ﾗヴ デhe normal exercise 
of sovereign power, are deemed not to apply (Jones 2015, 2016; Ronald Shaw and Akhter 2012; 
Neocleous 2013; Weizman 2017). As Kyle Grayson (2016) argues, drone warfare is made possible, 
furthermore, through the logics of liberal governance. These contributions have also tended to locate 
their analysis within a longer history of state violence and terrorism, with a particular focus on the 
political economy and imperial dimensions of such violence. Ian Graham Ronald Shaw and Majed 
Akhter (2012), for example, demonstrate how the legacy of British Empire has meant that the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan occupy a particular exceptional status, excluding them 
from standard constitutional protections vesting in the Pakistani President the power to rule. It is 
within this exceptional legal space that thousands of casualties have resulted from US drone strikes.   
 
In many respects, British air power in the early twentieth century provides the paradigmatic historical 
case of imperial state terrorism, while the contemporary US exercise of air power, particularly through 
the drones programme, can be seen as a contemporary manifestation. Of course the motivations 
underpinning their recent and current endeavours are shared, and so the discussion that follows will 
focus both on the legacy of British air power from the 1920s, and the on-going role that Britain plays 
as a key partner in pursuit of contemporary US foreign policy, including in the drones programme. The 
theoretical assumptions underpinning this paper chime with works that explore the interplay between 
state power, capitalist elite interests and the use of disciplinary state violence from above (Barkawi 
and Laffey 1999, 403-34; Colás 2008, 619-43; Herring and Stokes 2011, 5-21; Jarvis and Lister 2014, 
43-61; Joseph 2011, 23-37; McKeown 2011, 75-93; Maher and Thomson 2011, 95-113; Raphael 2009b, 
163-80). Examining targeted killings from this perspective is also a lens through which to view the 
evolving nature of neo-imperialism in the 21st Century.  
 
I will begin by firstly, providing a brief account of the literature to date on the role of state terrorism 
in imperial and neo-imperial projects. This will include offering some brief reflections on the evolving 
relationship between the US and UK in their shared quest for hegemony in global politics. I will then 
argue that there are important similarities between the targeted killings programme, and previous 
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counterinsurgency operations, including operations involving the internment of terror suspects, and 
the targeting of specific individuals for interrogation and torture or disappearance. A common thread 
running through these programmes are the terrorising effects they have, and are intended to have, as 
part of a policing process aimed at crushing rebellions and reconfiguring or maintaining the political 
economy of the targeted territory. Another is the attempt either to conceal these illicit actions or, in 
the event they are exposed, to shroud them in a veil of legitimacy. Here I will draw important parallels 
┘ｷデｴ デｴW CIAげゲ ‘WﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐが DWデWﾐデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS IﾐデWヴヴﾗｪ;デｷﾗﾐ ヮヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏﾏWく In the conclusion I will offer some 
brief reflections on why I do not think we should abandon the quest to resolve the thorny legal 
questions around the targeted killings programme. Indeed, despite efforts to legitimise targeted 
ﾆｷﾉﾉｷﾐｪゲ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ けﾉ;┘a;ヴWげ (Jones 2016), there are very good reasons for highlighting how law is 
exploited by the powerful, but also for resisting the politicisation of the law, and looking for ways in 
which law can be a force for good.  
 
Imperialism, neo-imperialism and state terrorism 
As I have argued elsewhere, there has been relatively little scholarship on the use of state terrorism 
by liberal democratic states (Blakeley 2007, 2009a, 2008). The academic and policy worlds are both 
fixated on the threat from terrorism to Western states, such that the complicity of state terrorism 
tends to be side-lined (George 1991; Herman and O'Sullivan 1989; Raphael 2009a, 49-65; Miller and 
Mills 2009, 414-37). There are some notable exceptions. Noam Chomsky and Ed Herman led the way 
in developing a meticulously defended argument, that US support for state terrorism during the Cold 
W;ヴ ┘;ゲ ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa ; ヮヴﾗIWゲゲ ﾗa ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷゲｷﾐｪ ┌ﾐSWヴ U“ ゲヮﾗﾐゲﾗヴゲｴｷヮ け; ﾐWﾗ-colonial system of client states 
ヴ┌ﾉWS ﾏ;ｷﾐﾉ┞ H┞ デWヴヴﾗヴ ;ﾐS ゲWヴ┗ｷﾐｪ デｴW ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲ ﾗa ; ゲﾏ;ﾉﾉ ﾉﾗI;ﾉ ;ﾐS aﾗヴWｷｪﾐ H┌ゲｷﾐWゲゲ ;ﾐS ﾏｷﾉｷデ;ヴ┞ WﾉｷデWげ 
(Chomsky and Herman 1979b, ix; 1979a). Indeed, the national security states across Latin America 
during the Cold War used violence on an industrial scale, disappearing hundreds of thousands of 
people, torturing political dissenters all with substantial US military and political support (Chomsky 
and Herman 1979b; Dinges 2004; Doyle and Kornbluh 1997; Esparza, Huttenbach, and Feierstein 2009; 
Galeano 1973; Huggins 1998; Koonings 1999; Koonings and Kruijt 2004; McClintock 1992). The same 
was true in the Philippines and Vietnam (Welch 1974, 233-53; Valentine 2000; Chomsky and Herman 
1979a). Mark Curtis and Ian Cobain have followed up with contributions that have documented the 
use of state terror as a central component of UK foreign policy, although Curtis has been more focused 
than Cobain on the political economy dimension of state terrorism (Cobain 2012; Curtis 2003).  
 
Iﾐ ;ﾐ ;デデWﾏヮデ デﾗ ┌ヮS;デW Cｴﾗﾏゲﾆ┞げゲ ;ﾐS HWヴﾏ;ﾐげゲ ┘ﾗヴﾆが I W┝ヮﾉﾗヴWS デｴW IWﾐデヴ;ﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa ゲデ;デW デWヴヴﾗヴｷゲﾏ デﾗ 
processes of neoliberalisation, tracing its historical use as part of European and then American 
imperial and neo-imperial projects, particularly aimed at securing unfettered access to key markets, 
as well as core assets such as oil. While the post-Cold War preference has been to achieve these ends 
through consensual means, where significant obstacles arise in the form of political dissent and 
resistance, the US tends to resort to coercion (Blakeley 2009b). In a similar vein, Doug Stokes and Sam 
Raphael have explored the use of state terrorism in oil-ヴｷIｴ ヴWｪｷﾗﾐゲ ;ゲ ; ┘;┞ ﾗa け;ヴﾏﾗ┌ヴｷﾐｪげ デｴW 
neoliberalisation process and insulating local elites from dissent, thereby stabilising the production 
and flow of oil that underpins US hegemony (Stokes and Raphael 2010). 
 
State violence has been central to the imperial and neo-imperial projects of powerful states for 
centuries. Its use is deliberately intended to instil fear among populations to quell dissent and to force 
populations to acquiesce to the agendas of powerful political and economic elites. (For discussions on 
how state terrorism is defined, identified and evaluated, see: Gurr 1986, 45-71; Mitchell et al. 1986, 
1-26; Nicholson 1986, 27-44; Stohl 2006, 1-25; Stohl and Lopez 1984, 1986; Blakeley 2009b, 12-27). 
Terrorism was used widely by European colonial powers as they colonised and policed their colonies. 
Early European imperialism was characterised by expropriation of territory, settlement and resource 
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extraction. Subduing local populations tended to involve mass enslavement and forced labour (Bethell 
1984).  From the 1800s onwards, European empires were commercial as well as extractive, developing 
trade, and adding value to the expropriated land and resources, including slave labour (Wood 2003, 
45; 61-7; 82-3). This was particularly true of the British Empire, which was built on a logic of capitalism, 
and which marks a transition from pre-modern mercantilist imperialism to a capitalist system of 
states. This helps explain why at its most powerful, the British Empire co┗WヴWS ; ケ┌;ヴデWヴ ﾗa デｴW W;ヴデｴげゲ 
land mas and comprised approximately 500 million subjects by 1921. This, would, however, also be its 
undoing.  
 
A key feature of imperialism during the nineteenth century, as Alejandro Colás has argued, was the 
けW┝ヮﾗヴデ ﾗa デｴW デWヴヴｷデﾗヴｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ W┝Iﾉ┌ゲｷ┗W ゲデ;デW ;ゲ デｴW Sﾗﾏｷﾐ;ﾐデ aﾗヴﾏ ﾗa ヴ┌ﾉWげ (Colás 2008, 628). A 
preoccupation, therefore, of the later British Empire aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが ┘;ゲ けIﾉﾗゲｷﾐｪ aヴﾗﾐデｷWヴゲ ;ﾐS 
guaranteeｷﾐｪ ; ﾏﾗﾐﾗヮﾗﾉ┞ ﾗ┗Wヴ デｴW ﾏW;ﾐゲ ﾗa ┗ｷﾗﾉWﾐIW ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ SWﾉｷﾏｷデWS HﾗヴSWヴゲげ (Colás 2008, 629). 
Coercion was central to these efforts both to maintain primacy, and to enforce sovereign rule over 
territorial entities, not just for Britain but for fellow European colonial powers, just as it underpinned 
efforts to extract taxes, exploit labour or crush rebellions. Violence was widespread and very public, 
serving as a warning to those who would resistく C;ヴﾗﾉｷﾐW Eﾉﾆｷﾐゲげ (2005) work on Kenya provides a very 
detailed account of the extent of violence and terror deployed in attempts to crush the Mau Mau 
insurgency. (For other accounts of violence and terror by various European imperial powers see: 
Arendt 1966; Beckett 2001; Elkins 2005; Bethell 1984; Killingray 1986, 411-27; 1973; Porter 1968; 
Suret-Canale 1971 [1964]; Bush and Maltby 2004, 5-34; Glancey 2003; Welch 1974, 233-53).  
 
Despite advances in air power, discussed below, Britain, was not prepared for the enormous task of 
administering its extensive territories and their populations. It found itself completely over-stretched. 
As Colás argues: 
The need for industrial capital to exercise spatio-temporal control over both property and 
labour through the institutions of the territorially exclusive colonial state, coupled with the 
rise of mass politics which contested such social control with reference to the authority of 
デｴｷゲ ┗Wヴ┞ ゲデ;デWが ヴ;ヮｷSﾉ┞ ┌ﾐSWヴﾏｷﾐWS LﾗﾐSﾗﾐげゲ I;ヮ;Iｷデ┞ デﾗ ｴﾗﾉS ﾗﾐデﾗ ｷデゲ ｷﾏヮWヴｷ;ﾉ ヮヴｷﾏ;I┞ 
across the globe (Colás 2008, 629-30). 
These dynamics resulデWS ｷﾐ Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐげゲ W┗Wﾐデ┌;ﾉ ヴWデヴW;デ aヴﾗﾏ Eﾏヮｷヴe in the post-World War period, and 
the emergence of the US as the dominant global power. Imperialism would take on a different form. 
As British Imperialism declined, its legacy was the modern capitalist system of states, or, as Colás 
;ヴｪ┌Wゲが ; ┘ﾗヴﾉS Sﾗﾏｷﾐ;デWS H┞ IﾉﾗゲWS aヴﾗﾐデｷWヴゲが ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷデゲ ﾏ;ｷﾐ デ;ゲﾆ ┘;ゲ デﾗ けIﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌W ﾗヮWﾐｷﾐｪ Sﾗﾗヴゲ 
デﾗ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲデ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲげ (Colás 2008, 630). US neo-imperialism since 1945 contrasts with previous forms 
of imperialism in that it promotes political sovereignty elsewhere on the condition that the 
reproduction of capital is not undermined, and the US secures unfettered access to resources and 
markets. Where such access is threatened, the US projects its power, deploying violence to terrorise 
those who would resist, sometimes directly, but frequently through proxies.  
 
Following the decline of British Empire, the UK has continued to play a role as a strategic partner of 
the US in its neo-imperial projects. Since the decline of the British Empire, the UK has tended to focus 
its military power on curtailing or destroying opposition to British and American interests, including 
by shoring up regimes considered friendly to US ;ﾐS UK ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲく Iデ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ デｴW U“げ IﾉﾗゲWゲデ ;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐ 
this regard, collaborating on intelligence sharing, investing in military bases in areas of key strategic 
significance, and partnering with the US in numerous actions to thwart challenges to their neo-
ｷﾏヮWヴｷ;ﾉ ;ﾏHｷデｷﾗﾐゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ デｴW ヱΓΓヱ G┌ﾉa W;ヴ aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ “;SS;ﾏ H┌ゲゲWｷﾐげゲ ｷﾐ┗;ゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa K┌┘;ｷデが ;ﾐS 
the wars in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Looking at contemporary UK military investment 
overseas, it is heavily concentrated on the Persian Gulf. As Sam Raphael and Jac St John have argued, 
Drones, State Terrorism and International Law 
P a g e  6 | 19 
 
Britain has a long history in the region; even after the break-up of British Empire, British oil companies 
┘WヴW ｴW;┗ｷﾉ┞ ｷﾐ┗WゲデWS デｴWヴWが ;ﾐS Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐ Iﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌WS デﾗ ヮﾉ;┞ ;ﾐ ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ ヴﾗﾉW ｷﾐ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデｷﾐｪ デｴW ヴWｪｷﾗﾐげゲ 
regimes against internal instability, as well as defending the Suez Canal and keeping the shipping lanes 
open. The UK continues both to play a supporting role to US hegemony in the region, and to enhance 
its own capacity to use the region as a base from which to project its power beyond the Gulf into 
Africa, the Indian Ocean and Asia (Raphael and St.John 2016, 3).  As Raphael and St John show, the 
UKげゲ ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ デﾗ デヴW;デ デｴW G┌ﾉa “デ;デWゲ ;ゲ け┗ｷデ;ﾉ ヮ;ヴデﾐWヴゲげ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ Wゲデ;Hﾉｷゲｴｷﾐｪ ﾐW┘ 
arrangements for the establishment of military bases, military and police training with a particular 
focus on managing civil unrest, and arms sales, all to the tune of millions of pounds. Partners are both 
states and military companies (Raphael and St.John 2016). Controversy surrounds the on-going 
support of regimes in the region, given their poor human rights records. Most recently, human rights 
NGOs have succeeded in launching a Judicial Review of UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia, given the alleged 
use of those arﾏゲ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ YWﾏWﾐｷ Iｷ┗ｷﾉｷ;ﾐゲ ;ゲ ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa “;┌Sｷ Aヴ;Hｷ;げゲ proxy war with Iran in Yemen, in 
which Saudi Arabia is seeking to destroy the Houthi militia, and in doing so, has killed thousands of 
civilians, allegedly deliberately targeted, and has left 19 million people in need of humanitarian 
assistance as the state infrastructure has collapsed (Ross 2017). TｴW U“げ ヴﾗﾉW ｷﾐ デｴW IﾗﾐaﾉｷIデ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ 
significant, not least because of its on-going campaign of targeted killings of individuals in Yemen 
suspected of involvement with Al Qaida.  
 
The attacks by Al Qaida on the 11th September 2001, as well as prior Al Qaida attacks on US interests 
in the Middle East, including the bombing of the USS Cole, were an affront to US primacy. They also 
ヮヴWゲWﾐデWS ; Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪW デﾗ デｴW U“げ ﾗ┘ﾐ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾗa ┘ﾗヴﾉS ﾗヴSWヴく TｴWゲW ;デデ;Iﾆゲ Wﾏ;ﾐ;デWS aヴﾗﾏ ; 
non-state global entity over which no other state seemed able to exert control or influence. The US 
was used to dealing with rebellions within states, using clients to crush dissent and eliciting consent 
from its own or other populations in these endeavours. Faced with Al Qaida, the US response was to 
deploy its overwhelming ground, air, and marine force in Afghanistan and then Iraq. The enormous 
displays of force in Afghanistan and Iraq have been accompanied by and followed up with various 
Iﾗ┗Wヴデ け┌ﾐIﾗﾐ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ┘;ヴげ Waaﾗヴデゲが Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷゲデｷI of US Cold War approaches to dealing with 
supposed enemies who would threaten US strategic interests.  The missions in Afghanistan and Iraq 
failed to curtail the threat. Indeed they splintered it. In Iraq the consequences were particularly 
Sｷゲ;ゲデヴﾗ┌ゲが ;ゲ デｴW CｴｷﾉIﾗデ Iﾐケ┌ｷヴ┞ ｷﾐデﾗ Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐげゲ ヴﾗﾉW IﾗﾐIﾉ┌Sed, since it resulted in thousands of civilian 
casualties, the entrenching of political instability, economic collapse, and Islamic state in control of 
large areas of the country (Chilcot 2016). TｴW U“げ ﾗﾐ-going struggle against Al Qaida, its affiliates, and 
most recently, ISIS, should be understood in relation to its quest to maintain its primacy. Those groups 
have the potential to undermine the contemporary order, especially in the Middle East, which is key 
デﾗ デｴW U“げ ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ ｴWｪWﾏﾗﾐ┞く The response, therefore, of the US has been to resort to supporting proxy 
wars, as well as to increasing its reliance on the drones programme to target high profile leaders of 
such groups, in the hope of toppling them from the top. The increased reliance on drones also relates 
デﾗ デｴW U“げ ┘ｷSWヴ assumptions about the benefits of air power, discussed below.  
 
The targeted killings programme and its pre-cursors 
By situating the drones programme for the targeted killing of terror suspects within this wider 
historical materialist framing, we can start to understand the programme not as a unique and novel 
development in warfare, but as a continuation of the imperial and neo-imperial violent practices of 
powerful liberal states that have their origins in early European colonialism. Specifically, the US 
approach to air power builds directly on the British experience of imperial policing through air power, 
developed in Iraq almost a century ago. We can also tease out the continuities with US military 
doctrine developed during the Cold War which was characterised by covert operations often involving 
human rights violations, and considerable effort to evade accountability for these. The analysis that 
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follows therefore examines the targeted killing programme in relation both to the evolution of air 
power as a form of policing, and デﾗ デｴW U“げ ┌ﾐIﾗﾐ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ┘;ヴ SﾗIデヴｷﾐW, developed during the Cold 
War, and characterised by illicit actions that violate international law. It also looks at the mechanisms 
by which the US and UK have sought to conceal their complicity in human rights violations, and in case 
of exposure, have attempted to establish mechanisms for evading accountability. This includes putting 
in place architectures aimed at shielding those responsible from prosecution under national and 
international law. In this sense, I seek to show how the targeted killings programme represents the 
most recent iteration of decades-long efforts by powerful liberal states to identify and target 
insurgents considered a substantial threat to US material interests for interment, interrogation or 
killing, and to legitimise their actions and evade accountability for these extensive human rights 
violations. It is my contention that rather than eschew the law, it is more important than ever in the 
quest to hold these states accountable.  
 
Air power as policing  
As Mark Neocleous shows, contemporary documents emanating from the US Department of Defense 
contain repeated references to what it learned from the British experience of policing Iraq  through 
;ｷヴ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ｷﾐ デｴW ヱΓヲヰゲが ヴWaWヴヴｷﾐｪ デﾗ ｷデ ;ゲ け; Iﾗ┌ﾐデWヴｷﾐゲ┌ヴｪWﾐI┞ ﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW デヴ┌Wゲデ ゲWﾐゲWげが ;ﾐS ;ゲ 
having been the decisive factor in the collapse of the revolt (Neocleous 2013, 579-80). Key elements 
of British air power were, firstly, that it was aimed at containing revolts with minimal use of ground 
force (Neocleous 2013, 579-81). The British approach in Iraq came to characterise the approach of the 
various European imperial powers in the inter-war years, as well as by the US in Mexico, the Dominican 
‘Wヮ┌HﾉｷI ;ﾐS NｷI;ヴ;ｪ┌;き け;ｷヴ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ;ﾐS Iﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ ヴ┌ﾉW ┘Wﾐデ ｴ;ﾐS ｷﾐ ｴ;ﾐSげ (Neocleous 2013, 581).  A 
second element of air power was that it offered a form of ヮヴW┗Wﾐデｷ┗W ヮﾗﾉｷIｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS Hﾗデｴ けゲデｷaﾉW 
SｷゲﾗヴSWヴ ;デ ｷデゲ Hｷヴデｴげ ;ﾐS けIﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデ ; ﾐW┘ ┘ﾗヴﾉS ﾗヴSWヴげ (Neocleous 2013, 582).  In 1920, the British air 
force I;ヴヴｷWS ﾗ┌デ ﾐｷｪｴデ けデWヴヴﾗヴげ ヴ;ｷSゲ デﾗ Iヴ┌ゲｴ ; ヴWHWﾉﾉｷﾗﾐ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ Bヴｷデｷゲｴ ﾗII┌ヮ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Iヴ;ケく TｴWゲW ヴ;ｷSゲが 
4,800 flying missions in total, were described by Wing Commander J.A.Chamier as the best way to 
demoralise the local population by concentrating bombing on villages, houses, inhabitants, crops and 
cattle, continuously (Glancey 2003). As such, the British were denying traditional subsistence living 
among tribes, and enforcing the colonial political economy of primitive accumulation (Neocleous 
2013, 582). A third element of air power was the impact it had on the political conduct of colonised 
s┌HﾃWIデゲが けIﾗﾐゲﾗﾉｷS;デｷﾐｪ デｴWｷヴ ;Iケ┌ｷWゲIWﾐIW デﾗ デｴW ﾐW┘ ┘ﾗヴﾉS ﾗヴSWヴげ (Neocleous 2013, 584). In the 
discussion that follows, we can see how the policing of targeted populations was not just a feature of 
air campaigns, but came to also shape various ground-based counterinsurgency operations. Stifling 
dissent to usher in a new world order also occurred through programmes for mass internment and 
デﾗヴデ┌ヴWが ;ゲ ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa デｴW U“げゲ け┌ﾐIﾗﾐ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ┘;ヴげ SﾗIデヴｷﾐWく PWヴhaps what air power offered that other 
forms of counterinsurgency warfare did not, was the all-seeing capability it provides. The aircraft was 
a tool of surveillance and of generating comprehensive geographical knowledge, through land surveys 
and data-gathering (Neocleous 2013, 583-4). Indeed, as Neocleous shows, the exponential growth in 
ヴWIWﾐデ ┞W;ヴゲ ｷﾐ デｴW U“げゲ ┌ゲW ﾗa ┌ﾐﾏ;ﾐﾐWS ;Wヴｷ;ﾉ ┗WｴｷIﾉWゲ ふUAVゲぶ Wケ┌ｷヮゲ デｴW U“ ﾐﾗデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW 
technical capability to threaten and use violence from a distance, but also with an unrivalled 
surveillance coverage of states considered key to its counter-terror operations (Neocleous 2013, 588-
90). Such surveillance is now supplemented by the gathering of a whole range of electronic data that 
feeds into the methods the US and its allies use for target selection.  
 
Unconventional war 
Aゲ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪW ﾗa デｴW U“げ targeted killings programme has grown, one surprising aspect of it has been 
the role President Obama opted to play in targeting decisions. For every operation the Department of 
Defense proposed, Obama claimed he would take the decision on whether or not to approve it. Those 
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decisions are based on assessments made of specific individuals whose biographies have been 
IﾗﾏヮｷﾉWS ;ﾐS ヴWIﾗヴSWS ｷﾐ ; ゲﾗヮｴｷゲデｷI;デWS S;デ;H;ゲW ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾐ ;ゲ デｴW けSｷゲヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾏ;デヴｷ┝げが ﾗﾐ デｴW ｪヴﾗ┌ﾐSゲ 
that they are considered to pose a threat to US interests. The matrix also contains their suspected 
locations, dependent at least to a degree on aerial surveillance facilitated by drones, as well as options 
for eliminating them. The matrix was compiled by the US Counter-Terrorism Center and brought 
together existing kill lists compiled by the CIA and by US Special Forces. Legal advice was sought on its 
compilation, much of which remains classified. However, a US Department of Justice memo that was 
leaked in February 2013 indicated that the killing of US citizens was deemed lawful if they pose an 
けｷﾏﾏｷﾐWﾐデ デｴヴW;デげ ﾗa ┗ｷﾗﾉWﾐデ ;デデ;Iﾆ ;ﾐS I;ヮデ┌ヴW ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ feasible (Cobain 2013).  Investigative journalists 
at The Intercept have obtained some secret US military documents that offer some small glimpses into 
the decision-making around targeting, including the chain of command for the approval of a lethal 
strike. A 2013 slide details the two-ヮ;ヴデ ヮヴﾗIWゲゲ aﾗヴ ;デ ;デデ;Iﾆが aｷヴゲデが けSW┗Wﾉﾗヮｷﾐｪ ; デ;ヴｪWデげ デﾗ 
け;┌デｴﾗヴｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ; デ;ヴｪWデげが ;ﾐS デｴW ゲWIﾗﾐSが け;┌デｴﾗヴｷ┣ｷﾐｪげ デﾗ け;Iデｷﾗﾐｷﾐｪげ ; デ;ヴｪWデく IﾐデWﾉﾉｷｪWﾐIW デW;ﾏゲ aヴﾗﾏ 
デｴW J“OCげゲ T;ゲﾆ FﾗヴIW ヴΒ-4, working with various other intelligence services, build the case for a target, 
which is then presented to staff higher up the chain of command, Centcom for Yemen and Africom for 
Somalia, then the Joint Chiefs of Staff, followed by the Secretary of Defense, before reaching the  
President (Currier 2015).  The slide contradicts the claim that Obama personally signs off on every 
strike. As Cora Currier at The Intercept states: 
The slide detailing the kill chain indicates that while Obama approved each target, he did 
not approve each individual strike, although news accounts have previously reported that 
the president personally けゲｷｪﾐゲ ﾗaaげ ﾗﾐ ゲデヴｷﾆWゲ ﾗ┌デゲｷSW ﾗa Aaｪｴ;ﾐｷゲデ;ﾐ ﾗヴ P;ﾆｷゲデ;ﾐく Hﾗ┘W┗Wヴが 
the slide does appear to be consistent with OH;ﾏ;げゲ IﾗﾏﾏWﾐデ ｷﾐ ヲヰヱヲ デｴ;デ け┌ﾉデｷﾏ;デWﾉ┞ Iげﾏ 
ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHﾉW aﾗヴ デｴW ヮヴﾗIWゲゲげ (Currier 2015). 
Further contradictions in what the White House claims and what actually occurs are also uncovered 
by The Intercept. Whereas the White House points to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force 
Act which permits the pursuit of members of Al Qaida and its affiliates, and Obama has indicated that 
targets must also pose a significant threat to the US, in practice, unknown individuals appear to have 
HWWﾐ デ;ヴｪWデWS ﾗﾐ デｴW H;ゲｷゲ ﾗa けヮ;デデWヴﾐゲ ﾗa ゲ┌ゲヮWIデ HWｴ;┗ｷﾗ┌ヴげく TｴW ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ;ヴW ヴWaWヴヴWS デﾗ ;ゲ TAD“ 
ﾗヴ けデWヴヴﾗヴ ;デデ;Iﾆ Sｷゲヴ┌ヮデｷﾗﾐ ゲデヴｷﾆWゲげが H┌デ ｷデ ｷゲ a;ヴ aヴﾗﾏ IﾉW;ヴ ┌ﾐSWヴ ┘ｴ;デ ;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞ ゲ┌Iｴ ゲ┌ヴ┗Wｷﾉﾉ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS 
then lethal targeting operations are governed  (Currier 2015). 
 
TｴW U“げ I┌ヴヴWﾐデ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デﾗ ｷSWﾐデｷa┞ｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS SW;ﾉｷﾐｪ ┘ｷデｴ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲ on the basis of patterns of suspect 
behaviour builds on the けunconventional warfareげ doctrine developed by the CIA and US military 
during the Cold War. The current approach may appear more sophisticated in some respects, thanks 
to advances in technology, but the underlying assumptions and principles would suggest continuity. 
They also echo the approach Britain took in efforts to crush rebellions in its colonies during the 
twentieth century.  
 
TｴW U“げ ┌ﾐIﾗﾐ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ┘;ヴa;ヴW SﾗIデヴｷﾐW ┘;ゲ Wゲデ;HﾉｷゲｴWS ｷﾐ デｴW ヱΓヵヰゲ けデﾗ ｪｷ┗W デｴW ﾏｷﾉｷデ;ヴ┞ ; I;ヮ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ 
ヮヴW┗ｷﾗ┌ゲﾉ┞ ヴWゲデヴｷIデWS デﾗ デｴW CIAげ  (McClintock 2001, 6). As Michael McClintock explains, US Special 
Forces developed expertise in offensive guerrilla warfare against a standing government, and after 
1960, in counterinsurgency. He states: 
Tｴｷゲ aﾗヴﾏ ﾗa ┘;ヴa;ヴW ┘;ゲ さ┌ﾐIﾗﾐ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉざ ｷﾐ デｴ;デ ｷデゲ デ;IデｷI;ﾉ ﾗヮデｷﾗﾐゲ ┘Wﾐデ HW┞ﾗﾐS デｴﾗゲW 
of conventional military operations and extended even beyond the framework of armed 
conflict itself. Operations were intended to be covert and were largely unconstrained by 
consideration of the laws of war. The practical constraints of deniability and the need to 
evade accountability were matched by a rationale that extraordinary measures were 
justified that would not be allowed in conventional armed conflict (McClintock 2001, 6). 
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There ensued an extensive programme to offer military training along these lines across Latin America. 
The US also sought to dominate intelligence sharing and communications across the region. A 
particularly striking aspect of this, was the emphasis on intelligence gathering which enables the 
categorisation of people according to their loyalties, on in contemporary parlance, suspect behaviour. 
Politicisation, intensification of religious unrest, and engagement in labour movement activity were 
all considered indicators that an individual was a threat (McClintock 2001, 10). As Michael McClintock 
explains, a 1985 manual, Tactical Intelligence, issued by US Southern Command, states that 
けさH;デデﾉWaｷWﾉS ヮヴWヮ;ヴ;デｷﾗﾐざ ﾏW;ﾐゲ IﾗﾉﾉWIデｷﾐｪ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗﾐ Iｷ┗ｷﾉ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ぎ ┘ｴﾗ ゲデ;ﾐSゲ aﾗヴ ┘ｴ;デが ┘ｴｷIｴ 
groups or individuals can be mobilized for counterinsurgency and which must be neutralizedげ 
(McClintock 2001, 10). A 1983 manual, Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, instructed 
Nicaraguan contras in assassination and related terror tactics. The Human Resource Exploitation 
manual, distributed among Latin American military personnel, advocated torture during interrogation 
(Blakeley 2006, 1441-43). As I have argued elsewhere, dozens of passages in multiple manuals 
distributed widely among the Latin American military encouraged numerous human rights violations, 
at a time when authoritarian regimes across the region were seizing power and going to extreme 
lengths to curtail any challenge, including widespread disappearances, torture and murder of political 
opponents (Blakeley 2006, 1439-61; 2009a, 85-105). 
 
It was within this context that Operation Condor emerged. This was a covert network linking the 
intelligence agencies of the Southern Cone states of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay with the CIAが HW;ヴゲ ;ﾉﾉ デｴW ｴ;ﾉﾉﾏ;ヴﾆゲ ﾗa デｴW U“げ ;ヮヮヴﾗach to counter-insurgency. Operational 
by 1975, its aims were to streamline information sharing so that covert agents could move through 
the region evading law enforcement, in their efforts to interdict insurgents for detention, but more 
often than not, elimination (McClintock 2001, 2).  A 1976 CIA Cable baldly states that けsecurity officials 
of Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay are reportedly expanding their cooperative anti-subversive activities 
to include assassination of top-level terrorists in exile in Europe,げ and that the programme involved 
けデｴW SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ﾗa ; IWﾐデヴ;ﾉｷsed data collectioﾐ I;ヮ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞げ (McClintock 2001, 3). Evidence to show 
direct US involvement in Operation Condor has been limited, but declassified documents obtained by 
J. Patrice McSherry indicate that the US facilitated the establishment of a regional secure 
telecommunications network between the various participating states (McSherry 2002, 144-75). 
There is also evidence that the source of much of the intelligence gathered by Paraguayan officials 
which resulted in the kidnapping and torture of hundreds of people by either the Paraguayans 
デｴWﾏゲWﾉ┗Wゲが ﾗヴ H┞ AヴｪWﾐデｷﾐ;げゲ “WIヴWデ;ヴｷ;デ ﾗa “デ;デW IﾐデWﾉﾉｷｪWﾐIW ┘;ゲ デｴW CIA (Slack 1996, 498). 
 
OヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ CﾗﾐSﾗヴ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ;ヮヮW;ヴ デﾗ HW;ヴ デｴW ｴ;ﾉﾉﾏ;ヴﾆゲ ﾗa デｴW CIAげゲ W;ヴﾉｷWヴ ヮヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏﾏWが OヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ 
Phoenix, which operated in Vietnam in the late 1960s. It too involved mass intelligence gathering on 
ゲ┌ゲヮWIデWS ｷﾐゲ┌ヴｪWﾐデゲ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ;ｷﾏ ﾗa ┘ｷヮｷﾐｪ ﾗ┌デ ┘ｴ;デ ┘;ゲ ;ゲゲ┌ﾏWS デﾗ HW デｴW VｷWデIﾗﾐｪげゲ ﾉW;SWヴゲｴｷヮく 
Characterised by mass incarceration, torture and assassinations, in hearings in 1971, CIA officer 
William Colby, who directed Phoenix between 1968 and 1971, claimed that over 20,000 Vietcong 
leaders were killed under the programme (Valentine 2000, 85). The reality is that the programme was 
intended not simply to destroy the leadership of the Vietcong, but to instil terror among the wider 
population. Furthermore, detailed research by Douglas Valentine shows that the killings were not 
ﾉｷﾏｷデWS デﾗ デｴW VｷWデIﾗﾐｪげゲ ﾉW;SWヴゲｴｷヮが H┌デ ;ﾉゲﾗ デｴWｷヴ a;ﾏｷﾉｷWゲが デｴWｷヴ ﾐWｷｪｴHﾗ┌ヴゲが ;ﾐS ;ﾐ┞ﾗﾐW suspected 
of having connections to them (Valentine 2000, 13 and 131). 
 
The unconventional warfare doctrine, embedded in the US military during the Cold War, appears to 
have shaped the approach the US has taken to counter-terrorism since the attacks of 9/11. A key 
element that tie programmes like Operations Phoenix and Condor to firstlyが デｴW CIAげゲ Rendition, 
Detention and Interrogation (RDI) programme, and secondly, the targeted killings programme that 
followed it, is the method of developing lists of individuals to be targeted. These lists are compiled 
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through extensive intelligence gathering and sharing with allies, with no apparent accountability or 
oversight of the assumptions that result in someone being added to these lists. There are compelling 
reasons to conclude that the intelligence resulting in the listing of an individual is likely to have been 
obtained through torture. The training manuals referred to above indicated that key aims of 
counterinsurgency interrogations were to obtain information about others associated with opposition 
movements, and that torture was condoned and encouraged. We also know from the US Senate Select 
Committee investigation into CIA torデ┌ヴW デｴ;デ ; IﾗヴW ;ｷﾏ ﾗa デｴW CIAげゲ ‘DI ヮヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏﾏW ┘;ゲ デﾗ ゲ┌HﾃWIデ 
detainees to torture in order to identify who the leadership of Al Qaida were and what other terrorist 
acts they were plotting (SSCI 2014, 13 of 499). As the Senate investigation found, in fact the use of the 
so-I;ﾉﾉWS けWﾐｴ;ﾐIWS ｷﾐデWヴヴﾗｪ;デｷﾗﾐ デWIｴﾐｷケ┌Wゲげ ┘WヴW ﾐﾗデ ;ﾐ WaaWIデｷ┗W ﾏW;ﾐゲ ﾗa ;Iケ┌ｷヴｷng intelligence 
or gaining cooperation from detainees (SSCI 2014, Findings and Conclusions: 2 of 19). 
 
Terrorising civilian populations into submission 
A further similarity between the targeted killings programme, the RDI programme, and there 
precursors is the terror they instil in a wider population. The terrorising impacts of programmes such 
as Operation Phoenix, Condor, and related counter-insurgency campaigns by the Latin American 
national security states have all been well-documented, for example by the reports of the Truth 
Commissions for El Salvador, Guatemala and Chile (CNCTR 1991; UNSC 1993; Tomuschat, Lux-de-Cotí, 
and Balsells-Tojo 1999). They each show that the targeting of individuals thought to be involved in 
insurgent activities, or those associated with them, for disappearance, torture and murder has a 
traumatic effect on those left behind, who fear that they will be next. An added dimension of the 
terror suffered by populations where the US and its allies are carrying out targeted killings by drones 
is the constant presence and noise of the drones overhead. In this regard, there are striking similarities 
with earlier aerial bombing campaigns deployed both by the British in the Middle East in the early 
twentieth century.  
 
A study by Stanford University provides a disturbing account of the trauma the drone strikes have had 
in areas frequently targeted in Pakistan. Health professionals, journalists and community members 
interviewed for the Living Under Drones study described how the constant presence of US drones 
increases the sense of fear in the community. The local populations are terrified, and they scream in 
fear at the sound of the drones. One Pakistani psychiatrist described patients presenting with 
symptoms he attributed to anticipatory anxiety, as they fear the next attack could be any time and 
they could be the next victim. Their own powerlessness to do anything further heightens the sense of 
trauma. Those who have witnessed strikes describe symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, 
emotional breakdowns, nightmares, disturbed sleep and insomnia, loss of appetite, and hallucinations 
(International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and Global Justice Clinic 2012, 80-4).  These 
;IIﾗ┌ﾐデゲ ヮヴWゲWﾐデ ;ﾐ ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪW デﾗ デｴW ;ゲゲ┌ﾏヮデｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ SヴﾗﾐW ゲデヴｷﾆWゲ ;ヴW けゲ┌ヴｪｷI;ﾉげ ;ﾐS 
けヮヴWIｷゲWげが ;ﾐS デｴWヴWaﾗヴW ﾉWゲゲ ｴ;ヴﾏa┌ﾉ デﾗ デｴW ┘ｷSWヴ ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ デｴ;ﾐ Iﾗﾐ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;ｷヴ I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐゲく Wｴ;デ 
they show is that there is a far less sharp distinction than the terrorising effects of drone strikes 
compared with conventional aerial bombardment than tends to be assumed.  
 
Evading accountability  
A second key element that ties the unconventional warfare programmes of the Cold War デﾗ デｴW け┘;ヴ 
on デWヴヴﾗヴげ CIA RDI and targeted killings programme is the deliberate intent to carry out human rights 
violations, whether torture or assassination in contravention of international law, while at the same 
time, going to great lengths to evade accountability for these actions. The mechanisms for evading 
accountability have been markedly different during the 21st Century. During the Cold War, US officials 
simply implemented programmes like Phoenix without any attempt to seek any legal justification or 
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legitimacy for them. They simply sought to keep them secret. The various truth commissions and 
inquiries that exposed the extent of US support for and involvement in human rights abuses during 
the Cold War rather set the tone for its actions following 9/11. The CIA had outlawed torture in 1988, 
following exposure of its role in authoring and developing training manuals that advocated it, during 
the Cold War. The then CIA Director asserted that the CIA rejected it not only because it is wrong, but 
because it has historically proven ineffective. This was also the official position articulated in the US 
Aヴﾏ┞ FｷWﾉS M;ﾐ┌;ﾉ けIﾐデWﾉﾉｷｪWﾐIW ;ﾐS IﾐデWヴヴﾗｪ;デｷﾗﾐげ (SSCI 2014, 18 of 499). Given the CIA and US 
Department of Defense position that they would uphold the anti-torture norm, it becomes clear why 
the Bush administration went to great lengths to try and secure legal justifications from the 
Department of Justice, both for the RDI programme and for its treatment of prisoners detained in US 
Department of Defense facilities, including in Guantánamo Bay. These efforts were of course highly 
secretive, and involved the exchange of a whole series of memos between the White House, CIA and 
Department of Defense, which are now declassified and have been extensively analysed (SSCI 2014; 
Greenberg and Dratel 2005; Blakeley 2011, 544-61; Sands 2008).  The explicit aim of these けﾉ;┘a;ヴWげ 
endeavours was to try and shield those involved in rendition, secret detention and torture from 
prosecution, in other words, evading any accountability. Key to this was the attempt to put in place a 
legal architecture justifying their actions as somehow short of torture, hence the use of the 
W┌ヮｴWﾏｷゲﾏ けWﾐｴ;ﾐIWS ｷﾐデWヴヴﾗｪ;デｷﾗﾐ デWIｴﾐｷケ┌Wゲげが デｴW Iﾉ;ｷﾏゲ デｴ;デ ┌ﾐﾉWゲゲ SWデ;ｷﾐWWゲ ゲ┌aaWヴWS ヮ;ｷﾐ ;ﾆｷﾐ 
to organ failure it did not count as torture, and the attempt to categorise those targeted as both guilty 
of terrorism, despite the absence of any legitimate due process to test that, and as somehow inhuman 
and therefore worthy of this treatment (Jackson 2005, 353-71; 2007, 394-426).  
 
The findings of the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence completely discredit the claims that 
the rendition and torture of terror suspects as part of the RDI programme could in any way be justified 
on legal grounds. By contrast, the wrangling over the legality or otherwise of the targeted killings 
programme has not been resolved. What is clear, however, is that just as the US Executive sought to 
assure itself that rendition and torture could be justified, it has sought similar reassurances from the 
Department of Justice in relation to targeted killings. The difficulties, as already stated, are that the 
much of the legal opinion obtained by the Bush and Obama administration remain classified. 
NW┗WヴデｴWﾉWゲゲが ｷデ ｷゲ デｴW I;ゲW デｴ;デ デｴW E┝WI┌デｷ┗Wげゲ ;ｷﾏ ｷゲ デﾗ Wﾐゲ┌ヴW デｴ;デ デｴﾗゲW ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗WS I;ﾐ HW ゲｴｷWﾉSWS 
from any liability. 
 
There are huge commonalities but also some subtle differences in how the US and the UK have 
managed their respective efforts to evade accountability. As I have argued elsewhere (Blakeley and 
Raphael 2016), in relation to the CIA RDI programme, whereas the US went to great lengths to develop 
a legal framework to justify the use of torture, by contrast, the British government repeatedly insisted 
on its commitment to upholding the torture prohibition. Specifically, whereas, the US suspended core 
commitments under international law and developed specific politico-legal justifications for the 
ｷﾐSWaｷﾐｷデW SWデWﾐデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS デﾗヴデ┌ヴW ﾗa けデWヴヴﾗヴ ゲ┌ゲヮWIデゲげが UK ;uthorities sought to maintain a level of 
procedural adherence to human rights norms and commitments, instructing its personnel to avoid 
taking formal legal custody of prisoners, and to ensure they were not directly involved in prisoner 
abuse. This gave huge latitude to UK personnel to share intelligence with the US even though it was 
widely known among UK intelligence personnel that the US was abusing prisoners, to receive 
intelligence from the US, even where it was likely torture had taken place, and to turn a blind eye 
when prisoner abuse was reported to them. Meanwhile, British authorities could continue to insist 
British personnel were compliant with international law.   
 
The US and UK approaches to legitimising the targeted killings programme are rather more uniform, 
although both continue to be shrouded in a degree of secrecy. Their justifications, as far as they can 
be established, are both founded on the assumption that it is legal to target an individual who poses 
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an imminent threat. This, as Craig Jones has argued, appears to build on Israeli legal opinion, which 
has evolved through the embedding of military lawyers in both the development of doctrine on the 
matter, as well as the role they play in live targeted killing operations (Jones 2015). In the case of the 
US, indications of these justifications for targeted killings first came to light when a white paper from 
the Justice Department was leaked in 2012. As Jameel Jaffer summarises: 
The targeted killing programme is predicated on sweeping constructions of the 2001 
A┌デｴﾗヴｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ UゲW ﾗa Mｷﾉｷデ;ヴ┞ FﾗヴIW ふAUMFぶ ;ﾐS デｴW PヴWゲｷSWﾐデげゲ ;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞ デﾗ ┌ゲW ﾏｷﾉｷデ;ヴ┞ 
force in national self-defense. The government contends, for example, that the AUMF 
authorizes it to use lethal force against groups that had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks 
and that did not even exist when those attacks were carried out. It contends that the AUMF 
gives it authority to use lethal force against individuals located far from conventional 
H;デデﾉWaｷWﾉSゲく Aゲ デｴW J┌ゲデｷIW DWヮ;ヴデﾏWﾐデげゲ ヴWIWﾐデﾉ┞ ﾉW;ﾆWS ┘ｴｷデW ヮ;ヮWヴ ﾏ;ﾆWゲ IﾉW;ヴが デｴW 
government also contends that the President has authority to use lethal force against those 
SWWﾏWS デﾗ ヮヴWゲWﾐデ さIﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌ｷﾐｪざ ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ デヴ┌ﾉ┞ ｷﾏﾏｷﾐWﾐデ デｴヴW;デゲ (Jaffer 2013, 185-7). 
Aゲ ｷﾐSｷI;デWS ;Hﾗ┗Wが デｴWヴW ｷゲ IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ;HﾉW SｷゲゲWﾐデ ﾗﾐ ┘ｴWデｴWヴ デｴW U“ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ 
justifiable under US and international law. My aim is not to rehearse the issues, but to show that the 
UK government seems to have adopted a very similar position. That said, the UK government has 
refused to publish a detailed explanation of its position in relation to international legal frameworks, 
despite repeated requests to do so from the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (HRC) 
(HRC 2016, 38-9). WW ﾗﾐﾉ┞ デｴWヴWaﾗヴW ｴ;┗W ; ゲWﾐゲW ﾗa デｴW UKげゲ ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ aヴﾗﾏ Waaﾗヴデゲ H┞ デｴW H‘C デﾗ ヮｷWIW 
it together. While then Prime Minister David Cameron and the Attorney General have not disclosed 
デｴW IﾗﾐデWﾐデゲ ﾗa デｴW ;デデﾗヴﾐW┞ ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉげゲ ;S┗ｷIW ﾗﾐ デ;ヴｪWデWS ﾆｷﾉﾉｷﾐｪゲが Hﾗデｴ ｪｷ┗W ゲﾗﾏW ｷﾐSｷI;デｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ ゲWﾉa-
defence in the face of an imminent threat underpins their position. The first indication デｴ;デ デｴW UKげs 
position was based on self-defence came when Cameron gave a statement in the House of Commons 
on 7 September 2015, following the drone strike on Reyaad Khan in Syria: 
I am clear that the action we took was entirely lawful. The Attorney General was consulted 
and was clear that there would be a clear legal basis for action in international law. We 
┘WヴW W┝WヴIｷゲｷﾐｪ デｴW UKげゲ ｷﾐｴWヴWﾐデ ヴｷｪｴデ デﾗ ゲWﾉa-defence. There was clear evidence of these 
individuals planning and directing armed attacks against the UK. These were part of a series 
of actual and foiled attempts to attack the UK and our allies, and given the prevailing 
circumstances in Syria, the airstrike was the only feasible means of effectively disrupting 
the attacks that had been planned and directed. It was therefore necessary and 
proportionate for the individual self-defence of the United Kingdom. The United Nations 
charter requires members to inform the President of the Security Council of activity 
conducted in self-defence, and today the UK permanent representative will write to the 
President to do just that (HRC 2016, 40). 
This was further elaborated by the Attorney General when giving evidence to the HRC on 15 
September 2015, in which he made reference to the imminent nature of the supposed threat from 
Khan. He stated:  
ぐｷﾐ ﾗヴSWヴ aﾗヴ ;ﾐ┞ ゲデ;デW デﾗ ;Iデ ｷﾐ ﾉ;┘a┌ﾉ ゲWﾉa-defence, it is necessary to demonstrate that 
there is an imminent threat that needs to be countered and that, in countering that threat, 
the action taken is both necessary and proportionate, and it is necessary to demonstrate 
that what you do complies with international and humanitarian law. In all of those respects 
I was satisfied that this was a lawful action (HRC 2016, 41).  
As the HRC report indicates, the Committee was far from convinced that it could judge the legitimacy 
ﾗa デｴW UK ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS ヴ;ｷゲWS ; ゲWヴｷWゲ ﾗa ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐゲ ;Hﾗ┌デ ｴﾗ┘ Iﾗﾐ┗ｷﾐIｷﾐｪ デｴW 
position was, givWﾐ デｴW ﾉ;Iﾆ ﾗa Iﾉ;ヴｷデ┞ ﾗ┗Wヴ ┘ｴ;デ けｷﾏﾏｷﾐWﾐデげ ﾏｷｪｴデ ﾏW;ﾐが ｴﾗ┘ け;ヴﾏWS ;デデ;Iﾆげ ┘;ゲ 
Drones, State Terrorism and International Law 
P a g e  13 | 19 
 
understood, and whether the UK government was correct or not in grounding its position in relation 
to the Laws of Armed Conflict, given that the drone strikes referred to happened outside a theatre of 
war (HRC 2016, 43-51). 
 
There remains a considerable lack of clarity on the legal advice the US and UK governments are relying 
on to justify their claims that targeted killings by drones are legal. What we do get a glimpse of is the 
common approach they seem to be taking in justifying their positions. Both are claiming executive 
authority to carry out these killings, based on secret processes for determining who poses an imminent 
threat to their interests at home or abroad, and secret processes for determining what is legal and 
what is not. As with the RDI programme, shrouding their actions in legal justifications is part of a 
process of shielding those responsible from being held accountable for their actions. If the Department 
of Justice or Attorney General approve it, then there are no grounds for challenge.  
 
The US and UK approaches to the legal questions surrounding the targeted killings programme seem 
to be indicative of attempts to insulate sovereign power from accountability. This was challenged by 
デｴW UKげゲ Jﾗｷﾐデ H┌ﾏ;ﾐ ‘ｷｪｴデゲ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWWが ┘ｴｷIｴ I;ﾉﾉWS ﾗﾐ デｴW UK ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ デﾗ けヴWIﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ ｷデゲ 
apparent position that there should be no accountability through the courts for any action taken 
ヮ┌ヴゲ┌;ﾐデ デﾗ ｷデゲ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ﾗa ┌ゲｷﾐｪ ﾉWデｴ;ﾉ aﾗヴIW ﾗ┌デゲｷSW ;ヴW;ゲ ﾗa ;ヴﾏWS IﾗﾐaﾉｷIデげ (HRC 2016, 86). This would 
also seem to be indicative of an emerging trend. Whereas during the Cold War, the tendency was to 
simply carry out covert operations and hope that these were not detected, since 9/11 the US and UK 
have sought to provide some form of protection for those involved in covert operations. Those 




In this paper I have argued that by situating the targeted killing programme within historical context, 
we can start to understand the programme less as a unique and novel development in warfare, and 
more as a continuation of the imperial and neo-imperial violent practices of powerful liberal states 
that have their origins in early European colonialism. The targeted killings programme is simply the 
latest デﾗﾗﾉ SWヮﾉﾗ┞WS H┞ デｴW U“ デﾗ a;Iｷﾉｷデ;デW デｴW ﾗII┌ヮ;デｷﾗﾐ けﾗa デｴW S;ﾐｪWヴﾗ┌ゲ ┗ﾗｷS ﾗa ﾗヮWﾐ ﾗヴ ┌ﾐSWaｷﾐWS 
frontiersげが ┘ｴWヴW けデWヴヴｷデﾗヴｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ゲW;ﾉWS ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞げ (Colás 2008, 621), has failed to deliver security 
for capitalism and for US primacy. Aゲ ┘W ｴ;┗W ゲWWﾐが デｴWヴW ;ヴW ﾏ;ﾐ┞ ゲｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴｷデｷWゲ HWデ┘WWﾐ Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐげゲ ┌ゲW 
of air power to police its colonies a century ago, and contemporary use of drones, whether to 
eliminate enemies, control populations, restructure or maintain the political economy, assert 
dominance, or obtain valuable data and intelligence.  
 
Viewing the targeted killings programme through historical materialist lenses, we can also tease out 
the continuities with US military doctrine developed during the Cold War. This was characterised by 
covert operations often involving human rights violations, and considerable effort to evade 
accountability for these. I have attempted to show that the targeted killing programme has a number 
of precursors. What ties the targeted killings programme to its antecedents is that they are all 
underpinned by the doctrine of unconventional war that the US developed in the Cold War era. Central 
to unconventional war programmes is the acquisition of intelligence on specific individuals considered 
a threat to US interests, with a view either to capturing and interrogating them, including through 
torture, to obtain further intelligence on other suspects, or to eliminating them. Today of course this 
is facilitated through surveillance by drones. A further continuity between the Cold War programmes 
and the RDI and targeted killings programme is the complete lack of transparency around the 
assumptions and methods used to gather and evaluate the veracity of the intelligence which informs 
the targeting decisions. Finally, a continuity running through each of these programmes is the 
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attempts the US and UK have made to evade accountability for them, either by operating covertly in 
ways that facilitate plausible deniability, or (and) by putting in place an architecture aimed at shielding 
those involved from prosecution for violations of international human rights and international 
humanitarian law. These amount to attempts to vest sovereign power in the Executive and shield it 
from any credible accountability.  
 
I do not share the view that that in focusing on the question of legality, scholars are colluding in 
attempts to legitimise human rights violations (Rothe and Collins 2014). Of course, there is a great 
deal of evidence to support the argument that military lawyers are intimately involved in efforts to 
use the law to justify and legitimise various aspects of war. We should make ourselves aware of this 
W┝WヴIｷゲW ｷﾐ けﾉ;┘a;ヴWげが H┌デ デﾗ WゲIｴW┘ デｴW ﾉ;┘ ｷゲ to throw the baby out with the bath water. Suspicion of 
law is not new. Marx criticised human rights as constructs of the state and the law to entrench elite 
dominance and privilege. As I have previously argued, rights, and for that matter, the law, can be 
deployed in emancipatory ways, but they can also be subject to manipulation (Blakeley 2013). This 
does not make them in and of themselves false or oppressive. Indeed, as Costas Douzinas argues, what 
I;ﾐ ゲ;┗W ｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ ヴｷｪｴデゲ ｷゲ デｴ;デ ｷﾐ デｴW デヴ;Sｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘ ;ﾐS ヴｷｪｴデ デｴWヴW ｷゲが ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ;が けｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ 
デヴ;ｷデ デﾗ ヴWゲｷゲデ Sﾗﾏｷﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ﾗヮヮヴWゲゲｷﾗﾐげ (Douzinas 2000, 176). As such, and in agreement with Judith 
Butler, I conclude that the law has an incredibly important role to play in けデｴW articulation of an 
international conception of rights and ﾗHﾉｷｪ;デｷﾗﾐゲ デｴ;デ ﾉｷﾏｷデ ;ﾐS IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ Iﾉ;ｷﾏゲ ﾗa ゲデ;デW ゲﾗ┗WヴWｷｪﾐデ┞げ 
(Butler 2004, 98). Sustained scrutiny, activism and litigation by organisations representing victims of 
デｴW CIAげゲ ‘DI ヮヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏﾏW W┗Wﾐデ┌;ﾉﾉ┞ ﾉWS デﾗ デｴW Iﾉﾗゲｷﾐｪ ﾗa デｴW ヮヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏﾏW ;ﾐS デｴW SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐ H┞ aｷヴゲデ デｴW 
Bush administration and then Obama to reinstate the prohibition on torture. It also led to the most 
IﾗﾏヮヴWｴWﾐゲｷ┗W ｷﾐ┗Wゲデｷｪ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW ｴｷゲデﾗヴ┞ ﾗa デｴW U“ “Wﾐ;デWげゲ “WﾉWIデ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWW ﾗﾐ IﾐデWﾉﾉｷｪWﾐIWが デｴW 
findings of which continue to reverberate within the CIA and US policy circles. As the death tolls 
increase, and the devastating societal impacts of the targeted killing programme escalate in growing 
numbers of countries, the struggle to wrest unaccountable sovereign power from the state and its 
agents should continue. With that in mind, human rights enshrined in international law will continue 
to play a critical role in seeking to hold officials to account when they seek to allocate sovereign power 
to themselves, free of transparency and accountability. By situating the targeted killings programme 
in historical context, we are better placed to understand how challenges to its precursors were 
mounted, and what strategies were most successful in seeking redress for victims and pushing the 
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